Xingye Wu

December 2017

Department of Economics
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027

Email: xingye.wu@columbia.edu
Personal Website:
http://wuxy.weebly.com/

Placement Chairs: Martin Uribe, mu2166@columbia.edu
Pierre-Andre Chiappori (Fall), pc2167@columbia.edu
Navin Kartik (Spring), nk2339@columbia.edu
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

Education:

2018 (expected)	Ph.D. in Economics	Columbia University
2014	M.A. in Economics	Columbia University
2012	B.A. in Economics	Tsinghua University

Honors and Awards:

2017 - 2018	**Dissertation Fellowship**, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2017	**Presidential Teaching Award**, Columbia University
2017	**Wueller Teaching Award**, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2016	**Wueller Teaching Award**, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2013 - 2014	**Ralph Erdman Holben Fellowship**, Columbia University
2012 - 2017	**Dean's Fellowship**, Columbia University

Research Interests:

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Matching Theory

Teaching Interests:

Microeconomics at any level, Math for economics students

Job Market Paper:

Core of Convex Matching Games: A Scarf's Lemma Approach

The core of a matching game is often empty when the market does not have a two-sided structure, contracts are multilateral, or agents have complementary preferences. In this paper, I use Scarf's lemma to show that given a convexity structure that I introduce, the core of a matching game is always nonempty, even if the game has an arbitrary contracting network, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences. I provide three applications to show how the convexity structure is satisfied in different contexts by different assumptions. In the first application, I show that in large economies, the convexity structure is satisfied if the set of participants in each contract is small compared to the overall economy. Remarkably, no restriction on agents' preferences is needed beyond continuity. The second application considers finite economies, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied if all agents have convex, but not necessarily substitutable, preferences. The third application considers a large-firm, many-to-one matching market with peer preferences, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied under convexity of preferences and a competition aversion restriction on workers' preferences over colleagues. Because of the convexity structure, all three applications have a nonempty core.

Work in Progress:

"Consistency Implication of Expected Utility Models"
"Credible Bayesian Persuasion"
"Dynamic Matching in Large Markets"
"Generalized Taxation Principle"

Teaching Experience:

Courses Taught as **Instructor** at Columbia University:

2016	Economics Ph.D. Math Camp
2015	Economics M.A. Math Camp

Courses Taught as **TA** at Columbia University:

2016 Fall	Ph.D. Microeconomics I, Qingmin Liu and Bernard Salanie
2016 Spring	M.A. Microeconomics II, Qingmin Liu and Christian Gollier
2015 Fall	M.A. Math Methods for Economists, Rajiv Sethi's pilot online course
2015 Spring	Advanced Microeconomics, Susan Elmes
2014 Fall	Introduction to Econometrics, Seyhan Erden Arkonac
2014 Spring	Introduction to Econometrics, George Steven Olley
2013 Fall	Ph.D. Microeconomics I, Konrad Mierendorff and Pierre-Andre Chiappori

Invited Seminars and Conference Presentations:

2017	Micro Student Lunch, New York University
2016	Conference on Market Design and Micro Theory, Seoul National University

References:

Yeon-Koo Che (advisor)
Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory
Department of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-8276
yc2271@columbia.edu

Qingmin Liu
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-2512
qingmin.liu@columbia.edu

Jacob Leshno
Assistant Professor
Decision, Risk, and Operations
Columbia Business School
(212) 854-1622
jleshno@columbia.edu

Rajiv Sethi (teaching reference)
Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Barnard College
(212) 854-5140
rs328@columbia.edu

George Steven Olley (teaching reference)
Director of the M.A. Program in Economics
Department of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-5712
gso2106@columbia.edu